Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic engines, especially on resource-constrained IoT devices. Presently, to perform EM SCA on an embedded IoT device, the entire chip is manually scanned and the MTD (Minimum Traces to Disclosure) analysis is performed at each point on the chip to reveal the secret key of the encryption algorithm. However, an automated end-to-end framework for EM trace collection and attack has been missing. This work proposes SCNIFFER: a lowcost, automated EM leakage SNIFFing platform to perform efficient end-to-end Side-Channel attacks. Using a leakage measure such as the signal amplitude or TVLA, we propose a greedy gradient-search heuristic that converges to one of the points of highest EM leakage on the chip (dimension: N × N ) within O(N ) iterations, and then perform Correlational EM Analysis (CEMA) at that point. This reduces the CEMA attack time by ∼ N times compared to an exhaustive MTD analysis, and > 20× compared to choosing an attack location at random. We demonstrate SCNIFFER using a low-cost custom-built 3-D scanner (< $300) compared to > $50, 000 commercial EM scanners, an H-field probe, and a variety of microcontrollers as the devices under attack. The SCNIFFER framework is evaluated for several cryptographic algorithms (AES-128, DES, RSA) running on both an 8-bit Atmega microcontroller and a 32-bit ARM microcontroller to find a point of high leakage and then perform a CEMA at that point.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the internet of things (IoT) continues to grow, security of many edge nodes has become critical. With many of these edge nodes being simple microcontrollers, side-channel attacks pose a powerful threat to their security. In the world of cryptography, side-channel attacks have long been identified as a threat to the security of computing and communication systems attempting to provide confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data, since the introduction of Differential Power Analysis in [1] . By analyzing physical side-channel information, such as power consumption, timing, or electromagnetic emissions, cryptographic algorithms that are mathematically secure can be broken efficiently.
EM side-channel analysis (SCA) is a method of using the information found in the electromagnetic emissions of a cryptographic system to extract the secret key, compromising the security of such a system. Such attacks have been shown to be capable of actually extracting secret key information, as in [2] and [3] . These EM emissions originate from the keydependent current consumption of physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms, which while flowing through the metal layers of an IC cause EM radiation as described in [4] . EM SCA attacks have successfully been used in the real world on PCs, shown in [5] and [6] , and also on Smart Cards, in [7] [8] . One powerful and commonly used side-channel analysis technique is correlational electromagnetic analysis (CEMA). In CEMA, EM measurements are taken while a cryptographic algorithm is executing on the target system (each measurement is known as a trace), and these traces are correlated with a leakage model, such as the Hamming Weight or Hamming Distance of data at a particular point in an algorithm [1] , under a hypothesis of a subset of the secret key. In a successful attack, the hypothesis that results in maximum correlation corresponds to the secret key. By attacking the hidden key incrementally, for example one byte at a time for AES-128, the entire secret key can be recovered, in orders of magnitude less time than brute force or other cryptanalysis methods. While EM SCA attacks generally proceed like power SCA attacks, the EM side-channel has a lower signal to noise ratio (SNR), and successful attacks require more traces in contrast with the power attacks. It is important to distinguish between signal and information in this context. "Signal" refers to the magnitude/amplitude, whereas "information" refers to the correlated side-channel leakage present in traces. Compared to power, EM traces have low signal (SNR), but could have a high information to noise ratio (INR), owing to the multidimensional nature of the EM signals. Hence, finding the best point of leakage (highest INR) is extremely critical to mount an efficient EM SCA attack. This notation of SNR and INR will be used for the rest of the manuscript.
A. Motivation
EM side-channel attacks, while powerful in that they are non-invasive and do not require any physical changes to the system being attacked, and benefit from multiple views, allowing an attacker to choose the view with maximum information leakage (INR), introduce a number of additional challenges compared to the power SCA attacks. Firstly, as the EM signals go through a power to EM transformation that reduces amplitude compared to the measurement noise floor, the SNR of these signals is reduced compared to the power side channel, meaning considerably more traces must be collected to perform an attack. Secondly, unlike power attacks, EM attacks require attackers to choose the location of the attack in the system to capture the EM traces. This choice can have a drastic impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of an attack. As seen in Figure 1 , depending on where the EM probe is placed on a chip, the MTD for a CEMA attack can vary by > 20×, even for the small 9mm x 9mm Atmega and STM microcontrollers used as the target devices for this work. Current methods for determining the best location to perform CEMA are based on exhaustive search, simply performing a CEMA attack at most locations. Alternatively, it is also possible to choose an arbitrary location, and use as many traces as necessary to perform the CEMA. Practically, if the size of the system is bigger, finding the correct location of the EM leakage becomes extremely challenging and requires scanning the entire chip/system. Given the limitations of present attack systems, in this work, we propose a low-cost, fully automated, end-to-end platform for performing efficient EM side-channel attacks. The core of this framework is a ∼ $200 3-D printer, which we have modified to utilize as a low-cost EM scanner. SCNIFFER also uses a greedy gradient-search heuristic using a leakage measure, such as signal amplitude, test vector leakage assessment (TVLA), or a combination of both to quickly and automatically locate the point of maximum leakage. Finally, once the point is determined, the proposed SCNIFFER framework performs the correlational or differential EM analysis (CEMA/DEMA) at this point. Such an automated low-cost attack platform significantly increases the threat surface for IoT devices.
B. Contribution
Specific contributions of this article are:
• Firstly, a fully-automated system for efficiently scanning a cryptographic chip and finding the location of maximum leakage to mount an end-to-end EM SCA attack is proposed. 
C. Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background and summarizes the existing works on EM Scanning and side-channel attacks. In Section 3, the SCNIFFER framework is introduced and the low cost, custom-built EM scanning platform is presented. Section 4 describes two options for measuring leakage, signal amplitude and TVLA, and provides motivation for finding the point of highest leakage. In Section 5, the gradient-descent algorithm for efficiently determining the point of maximum information leakage is proposed. Next, Section 6 provides results of running the system on microcontrollers of varying architectures, cryptographic algorithms executed, and measures of leakage. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
IoT devices have been successfully attacked using side channel attacks, for example CPA was used to extract encryption keys from Philips Hue smart lamps in [9] . EM sidechannel attacks originated in [10] , and share many properties with power side-channel attacks, however, can be performed at a distance, even up to one meter, as in [11] . One of the most powerful EM SCA attacks is CEMA, which is the straightforward application of Correlation Power analysis (CPA) [12] on EM traces.
Another distinction made between side-channel attacks is whether an attack is "profiled" or "non-profiled". In a profiled attack, the attacker uses an identical device to the device to be attacked, and creates a "profile" so that the attack on the target device can be more efficient. Profiled attacks require an identical device to be completely controllable by the attacker, and also generally make the assumption that the behavior of side-channels remain unchanged when moving from one device to another. Two main varieties of profiled attacks are Template Attacks, introduced in [13] , and more recently Machine Learning attacks, such as the SVM based attack discussed in [14] and [15] and the Neural Network based attack in [16] and [17] . Non-profiled attacks on the other hand do not require attackers to have unrestricted access to an identical device [12] [2] . However, to make these profiled and non-profiled EM SCA attacks more practical and real-time on any embedded platform/device, the trace capture and the attack needs to be automated and more efficient. SCNIFFER can use several methods of assessing leakage, either simple signal magnitude, or Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) [18] . In TVLA, two sets of traces are collected. In one set, both the key and plaintext used as input to the algorithm under test are kept fixed, and in the other the plaintext is varied randomly, while the key remains fixed. To assess the leakage, one then performs Welch's t-test for each time point of the trace. If the maximum t-value across all time points is below 4.5, one can conclude leakage is not present.
Addressing the issue of finding where a chip leaks the most EM radiation has been investigated in [?] , and [19] . EM scanning with a focus on side-channel attacks, that is, determining where the most cryptographic information leaks within a chip has been addressed in [20] and [21] . However, such methods focus on observing the leakage over the entire chip, not efficiently finding the point or region of the maximum leakage. This causes these methods to take a long time and a majority of the time is spent collecting data that is unnecessary for an attacker. By creating a framework that minimizes this unnecessary data collection, EM side-channel attacks can be made more efficient, powerful, and practical, requiring far fewer traces to reveal the secret key of the cryptographic algorithm. Additionally, these platforms can be orders of magnitude more costly than the system proposed in this work, for instance the Riscure EM Probe station [22] itself can cost ∼ $50, 000, while the entire SCNIFFER system costs < $500. SCNIFFER is the first fully-automated, efficient EM SCA attack framework and the system is described in the following section.
III. SCNIFFER: LOW COST AUTOMATED EM SCANNING
The SCNIFFER system is designed for low cost and automation. In this section, we first describe the physical com- ponents that make up SCNIFFER, then discuss the automation aspect of the system.
A. Low Cost EM Scanning Setup
The scanning hardware consists of an Ender 3 3-D printer [23] with an H-field probe attached to the extruder, the Chipwhisperer [24] platform for interfacing with the victim and trace collection, an amplifier to amplify the EM probe output, and finally a PC to control both the 3-D printer and Chipwhisperer platform. While such EM scanning systems do exist, for instance, Riscure's EM Scanning Station, we chose to create such a system from scratch for the following reasons: 1) Commercial scanning systems (like Riscure [22] ) scanning station is orders of magnitude more expensive and 2) It is very straightforward to interface with the custom system to develop the scanning algorithm. To manipulate the probe, an Ender-3 3-D printer, running stock firmware was used. This model of printer has a minimum step size of 0.1mm, and can be controlled via a USB serial connection. It has a maximum movement speed of 180 mm/s, with a print area of 220mm × 220mm × 250mm. The precision and speed offered by this 3-D printer are sufficient to complete a 50 × 50 scan of the 9mm×9mm IC used in testing in an acceptable time. The system is capable of performing a 30 × 30 scan of the chip in ∼ 15 minutes, and perform an amplitude scan in ∼ 75 minutes. The probe used is a commercial H-field probe for performing EMC measurements, and the signal is amplified before being passed to the Chipwhisperer capture board. While the probe used does not have extremely high spatial resolution, the probe resolution matches the scan resolution, allowing amplitude heatmaps such as the one in Figure 3 (a) to be created, and Chipwhisperer is able to capture enough information leakage for the target devices considered, leading to low MTDs when probed at appropriate locations, as seen in figure 1, while still being low cost. The complete system is shown in Figure 2 (a) showing the 3-D printer, the probe, Chipwhisperer system, and PC. The probe and victim IC are shown in detail in Figure 2 (b). Note that during an attack, the victim board is positioned such that the chip is parallel (horizontal) to the probe. The probe position can be controlled manually, through the 3-D printer controls, or programmatically through the serial connection to a PC, as it is in the SCNIFFER system.
The major cost savings in the SCNIFFER system come from using a low cost 3-D printer to control the probe, instead of a high cost motorized table. The total cost of the 3-D printer, probe and amplifier used in SCNIFFER is ∼ $500, which is a few orders of magnitude less expensive than many motorized tables by themselves, and nearly two orders of magnitude less expensive than systems such as Riscure's EM probe station (∼ $50, 000). While more expensive scanners, probes and measurement systems could improve spatial and frequency resolution, such a system would only be available to very sophisticated attackers. As SCNIFFER aims to demonstrate X Y Amplitude 30x30 AES Amplitude Heatmap Averaged practical, low-cost attacks are possible using systems two orders of magnitude cheaper than existing scanners, high-cost, high resolution components are not used. Table I summarizes these components, including their costs and performance to the Riscure system.
B. Automated EM Scanning
Now that the SCNIFFER system's low cost hardware has been described, we move to the automated scanning and attack procedure. The basic premise of the automated system is to locate a point on the target device that maximizes some leakage measure by using the scanning algorithm specified in Section 5, then automatically perform CEMA at this point. This removes the need for an expert to manually analyze example traces to choose a location for an attack.
During an attack, the probe is positioned at a location dictated by the intelligent scanning algorithm, then, the appropriate ADC phase for trace collection is determined by capturing traces at varying ADC phases, and the phase giving the largest average peak-to-peak amplitude is chosen for further measurements at that particular point. Chipwhisperer is then used to capture traces for leakage measurement (through signal amplitude or other measures) and finally CEMA is performed at the highest location of leakage as determined by the algorithm. Example leakage measures tested with SCNIFFER, and the development of the intelligent scanning algorithm, along with detailed results are described in the following sections.
IV. SIGNAL LEAKAGE MEASUREMENT USING SCNIFFER
As the choice of probe location is a major factor in determining the number of traces needed to recover a key in CEMA as shown in Figure 1 at several locations, and choosing a location based on visual inspection. While an exhaustive search will certainly produce the best location to attack, it requires a large amount of time, especially for systems with a large initial MTD. Choosing a location based on visual inspection may result in a location that can be attacked, however not necessarily the best in terms of MTD. Additionally, this method requires an expert to perform the inspection of traces. In this work, we aim to fully automate the process of choosing a location as an expert might, by looking at measures of leakage, and finding the location with maximum leakage. As with a manual choice, this location may not be the location corresponding to the lowest MTD, but should leak enough information to be attacked in a reasonable amount of time.
SCNIFFER is designed such that any measure of leakage can be used. For example signal amplitude, Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) [18] , or a combination of both could be used, and the SCNIFFER platform will be able to converge to the location maximizing that measure in O(N ) measure- From these plots TVLA appears to correlate to MTD much better than the signal amplitude. While amplitude is often used in practice to determine the location to attack, it is clear that high amplitude of leakage does not necessarily correspond to high information leakage.
ments. We provide results using both signal amplitude and TVLA, both described, and then compared in the following subsections.
A. Signal Amplitude for Leakage Measurement
As the amplitude is being used as a proxy for leakage, it must be measured in a repeatable way, so given a trace, the overall amplitude of the trace is calculated as the difference between the means of the five highest values and five lowest values in the trace. Using this method, the surface appears as in Figure 4(a) , and is very rough. To explain this roughness, the amplitude measurement was performed many times at a single location resulting in the distribution of amplitude values found in Figure 4 (b). From this distribution, the local minima and maxima of the surface can be explained. To create more repeatable results and a smooth surface for the gradient search algorithm described in the next section, we average 10 amplitude measurements at each location to create the final amplitude value. This method resulted in the surface shown in Figure 5 , and is used throughout Section 5 to demonstrate the SCNIFFER search algorithm.
B. TVLA for Leakage Measurement
One alternative to using the amplitude to measure leakage is TVLA. While high t-values from TVLA may not necessarily imply a low MTD, it allows locations that cannot be attacked to be avoided. The TVLA performed is the non-specific, fixed versus random t-test. We choose N = 200 for the number of traces in each group, for a total of 400 traces per TVLA performed. This number of traces creates large separation between points of low leakage and ones of high leakage, as seen in Figure 6 (a), where the high leakage location reaches a t-value of 22, while the low leakage location only reaches a t-value of 4. Note that the TVLA surface is rough, like the non-averaged amplitude surface in Figure 4(a) . As with the amplitude measurements, even at a fixed location there is variance in the TVLA measurements, shown in Figure 6 (b). Unlike with amplitude however, it is infeasible to perform many TVLA measurements at each point to average out this noise.
C. Correlation among Amplitude, TVLA, MTD
While both the signal amplitude and TVLA can be used with SCNIFFER as measures for leakage, since the end goal of the SCNIFFER system is to perform an attack, we investigate how these measures compare to the MTD at each location. To compare the measures, a 10 × 10 scan of the chip was performed, and CEMA performed using 5,000 traces at each point. The resulting heatmap, along with heatmaps for both TVLA and amplitude, are shown in Figure 7 . From these results, clearly TVLA appears to correlate to the MTD more strongly than the amplitude. While signal amplitude is often used in practice to manually determine locations to attack, there is no guarantee that this measure correlates to the MTD, as high signal leakage does not imply high information leakage. Additionally, an uncorrelated EM source having high signal leakage could confuse an attacker into choosing a poor location to attack. While TVLA also does not guarantee high leakage, it can be used to identify and avoid areas where attacks are not possible. Additionally, for the microcontroller considered in this work, TVLA does empirically correlate to the MTD quite well, even if it is not guaranteed to be the case in general.
V. GREEDY GRADIENT-SEARCH HEURISTIC
A critical piece of the SCNIFFER system is the algorithm for locating the point leakage maximizing the leakage measure. It is through this algorithm that the SCNIFFER attack framework gains benefits over an exhaustive search, as the best location in an N ×N grid can be found with N measurements as opposed to N 2 . As an example, we use simple amplitude measurements to demonstrate the performance of the SCNIFFER greedy gradient-search algorithm throughout this section. The remainder of this section describes the algorithm in detail, and provides results of running the algorithm on an Atmel XMEGA 8-bit processor running software AES.
A. Algorithm Description
To avoid taking measurements at all possible points, we propose a heuristic search algorithm for finding the point of maximum leakage in a minimum number of scans. The search algorithm works in two phases. In the first phase, the search space is divided into an N × N grid, and the leakage is measured at the center of each grid cell. Then in the second N = Grid Resolution; maxLeakage = 0; initLocs = getInitialLocations(initialGridSize, N); for loc ∈ initLocs do moveProbe(loc); leakage = getLeakage(); if leakage > maxLeakage then maxLeakage = leakage; startLoc = loc; end end moveProbe(startLoc); bestLoc = startLoc; m = startLoc; while Not Converged do delta = getDelta(get4Neighbors()); m = m−stepSize * delta; moveProbe(m); leakage = getLeakage(); if leakage > maxLeakage then maxLeakage = leakage; bestLoc = loc; end end Algorithm 1: Gradient Search Heuristic to find the best leakage location phase, a gradient search algorithm is started from the point of the highest leakage found in the first phase. The gradient is estimated by taking leakage measurements in 4 points surrounding the current location, and calculating the direction of greatest ascent, and moving a distance of stepSize in that direction. Note that it is possible to use different measures of leakage for the two phases, for example the initial points are scanned using TVLA, then the gradient search is based on amplitude. The algorithm will stop if it attempts to measure outside the search space, instead moving only to the edge. A maximum number of iterations can also be specified, along with an "iterations without improvement" stopping criteria. This two phase process is described in Algorithm 1.
B. Performance
Based on experimental results, the algorithm is able to locate the point of maximum leakage in a N × N grid of possible measurements in ≈ N amplitude measurements. Figure 8 demonstrates that as the search grid size increases by N 2 , the number of tests required only increases by N , showing the improvement over an exhaustive search is more drastic as the size of the scan increases, either due to increased resolution or larger scan area. We also see the effect of the parameters of the algorithm, and see how varying them affects performance. In Figure 9 (a), where, by increasing the resolution of the initial search grid, the highest amplitude found for a given number of measurements changes. As expected, as more initial points are scanned, fewer gradient steps are required to converge to the point of maximum leakage. In Figure 9(b) , the step size
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Scaled Amplitude Fig. 8 : Leakage vs. number of amplitude measurements for varying grid scales. The data for the 30×30 grid was the same as in Figures 3 and 4 . The full 60 × 60 and 10 × 10 grids were also collected, allowing the performance of the algorithm to be seen at various degrees of measurement resolution. Through these results, it can be seen that even as the size of the search space increases by N 2 , the time to find the maximum leakage point increases by only N .
is varied, and we see that for a small step size, the algorithm does converge to the point of maximum leakage, but slowly. A larger step size finds the maximum also, and in slightly fewer steps. If the step size is too large however, the algorithm will not converge to the maximum, as it will continuously step over the best point. Note that the effective step size is a function of both the resolution of the scan, N , and the step size parameter of the algorithm. This, along with the dimensions, L, of the chip allow calculating the effective step size as 1 N * L mm * StepSize. Given these results, one can see that for reasonable choices of parameters, the algorithm is observed to converge to the point of highest leakage in O(N ) steps for an N × N grid of measurements, providing SCNIFFER with a significant improvement over an exhaustive search.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we provide results of using the SCNIFFER framework in various scenarios. We start with the results of an attack using only the signal amplitude measure (Case 1), only TVLA (Case 2), and a combination TVLA for initial search with signal amplitude for gradient search and vice versa (Cases 3 and 4, respectively). Following this, we provide a short discussion of the number of traces needed in a SCNIFFER attack. We then show the performance of cases 1 and 2 for a variety of cryptographic algorithms. Finally, results comparing the 8-bit architecture chip used so far to a 32-bit architecture chip are shown, again for both amplitude and TVLA measures.
A. Amplitude Based SCNIFFER
Initially, we look at the results of using the signal amplitude measure for both the initial gird search and the gradient search phases of the search algorithm. Figure 10(a) shows the path
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Maximum Scaled Amplitude a) b) Fig. 9 : (a) Leakage vs number of amplitude measurements performed for varying the initial sample grid size parameter. Note that the 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 grids locate the point of maximum leakage within 20 measurements, while a single point start only reaches a lower amplitude, and after 30 such measurements. For all initial sample grid sizes, a step size of 0.84mm was used. (b) This demonstrates the effect of step size on performance. A step size too small slows convergence unnecessarily, and in this case as the step size increased, convergence sped up, however, for much larger step sizes, it is possible to overshoot the location of highest leakage, resulting in non-convergence. For all step sizes, a 2 × 2 initial sample grid was used. taken by the SCNIFFER search algorithm, using amplitude for both choosing the initial point and for gradient search (Case 1) to find the location of highest EM amplitude, with the dotted line showing the path taken to scan the initial points, and the solid line showing the path taken by the gradient algorithm. Figure 11(a) shows the separation of the correct key from a CEMA performed at this location. While this result is not ideal, as it requires > 5× more traces than the best location (seen in Figure 1(a) ) it can be attacked. However, looking back at Figure 7 , amplitude does not correlate with MTD, as high signal leakage does not imply high information leakage. Indeed, the location this case converges to is on the edge between an area of high leakage and one of very low leakage. This shows that using only amplitude to locate information leakage is not robust. However, amplitude based search is very fast, as only 10 traces at each point are needed to measure amplitude.
B. TVLA Based SCNIFFER
As an alternative to signal amplitude, TVLA can be used for both stages of the SCNIFFER algorithm (Case 2). The path taken for this case is shown in Figure 10 (b). This 5 step path remains in the zone of high TVLA values, and as TVLA correlates well with MTD, this location has a very low MTD, seen in Figure 11(b) , and is among the lowest on the chip. Unlike case 1, this location is not close to any zones of low information leakage, making the TVLA only method much more robust than the amplitude case. This robustness comes at the cost of needing many more traces, as each location requires a total of 400 traces to compute TVLA. Additionally, as the TVLA surface is less smooth, the number of steps to converge is generally higher than amplitude, further increasing Fig. 11 : MTD plots at locations found by SCNIFFER in cases 1(a), 2(b), 3(c), and 4(d). While the MTD is not the minimum, it is much better than the worst locations for cases 1, 2, and 3. For case 4, the key cannot be recovered in 5000 traces. the attack time.
C. Amplitude + TVLA Based SCNIFFER
In order to trade off time for robustness, the amplitude based measure and TVLA can be combined. Two methods for combining the measures are using one measure for the initial grid search and the other for the gradient search. The results of these combinations, along with cases 1 and 2 are given in Table II . From this table, the combination which uses TVLA for the initial search and amplitude for gradient search gives the best trade-off of time for robustness, converging to a point that remains well within the area of high leakage, while using only slightly more traces than the amplitude only case 1. Figure 11 (c) shows the key separation for this location. The opposite case 4 however, performs very poorly, as it begins at a point of low TVLA leakage, and is not able to escape that region, leading to a large number of traces used in search and an MTD > 5000, as seen in Figure 11(d) . Lastly, at the SNR levels of the system attacked in this work, case 3 gives the best robustness-time trade-off of the 4 cases, however, as the SNR decreases eventually the TVLA only attack will require fewer total traces, as the number of traces is dominated by the CEMA attack, not the search, as seen in Figure 12 .
D. Number of Traces Needed For SCNIFFER Attacks
The performance of the SCNIFFER platform can be quantified and compared to other methods by investigating how the total number of traces needed to perform an attack changes as the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the device under attack changes. Previous works have shown in [25] and [26] that the MTD for a CEMA attack is related to the SNR of the signal used in the attack by M T D = k 0 * 1 SN R 2 . Additionally, [27] have shown that the number of traces N T V LA needed to perform a TVLA is also related to SNR by N T V LA = c 0 * 1 SN R . From there, it is straightforward to quantify the performance of an exhaustive search and SCNIFFER using both amplitude and TVLA as follows,
where N × N is the resolution of the grid scan.
A SCNIFFER attack requires measurements to be made at approximately N points for an N × N grid, as the search algorithm requires O(N ) measurements, with each requiring 10 traces to be averaged together in the amplitude case, and N T V LA in the TVLA case. Additionally a single CEMA attack requiring M T D traces is needed, resulting in equations (1) and (2) . An exhaustive search on the other hand would require a CEMA to be performed at all N 2 locations, resulting in equation (3) . These trends are pictured in Figure 12 , which clearly shows the 100× reduction in required traces for the case of a 10 × 10 scan once a certain SNR is reached. This reduction can be explained by the fact that the number of traces needed to measure TVLA changes as 1 SN R , compared to the MTD which changes as 1 SN R 2 . Additionally, the number of points traversed is only N , as opposed to N 2 for an exhaustive search. Also, we see that amplitude measurements only outperform TVLA as a leakage measure for high SNR regions, as MTD dominates in regions of low SNR.
E. Effect of Cryptographic Algorithm on Convergence
Next, in Figure 13(a) , the effect of different cryptographic algorithms running on the target microcontroller can be seen, when using the amplitude measure. For AES, DES, and RSA, the gradient search algorithm converges to the point of maximum amplitude in a similar number of traces. A 30 × 30 scan was performed for all algorithms, and the parameters were fixed at a 2 × 2 starting grid and step size of 0.54 mm for all cases. A similar plot, using the same parameters but TVLA as opposed to amplitude can be seen in Figure 13(b) . Again, the search converges in approximately the same number of measurements for all algorithms. Through this, we see that the greedy gradient search algorithm performs well regardless of the specific cryptographic algorithm, and regardless of the leakage measure chosen.
F. Effect of Architecture on Convergence
Lastly, we investigate the effect of different architectures (microcontrollers) on SCNIFFER. Up to now, the results shown have been obtained with an 8-bit XMEGA microcontroller. We now use a 32-bit STM32F3 microcontroller running software AES as the target device. Given the same parameters for the greedy gradient search, the maximum leakage location is found within N measurements, with N = 30 in this case. These results are shown in Figure 14 (a) for the amplitude measure, and Figure 14 (b) for TVLA. In both figures, the 8-bit and 32-bit architectures are compared, given the same measurement and search algorithm parameters. For all combinations, while the value of the maximum changes between the architectures and measures, the search algorithm finds the location maximizing the leakage measure in O(N ) measurements. Note that for amplitude measurements, one of the initial points happened to be almost exactly the location of the maximum, appearing to not find a maximum, when in reality it is found in a single step. The case of using TVLA with the 32-bit microcontroller was particularly motivating, as only a small portion of the chip leaked any information, however SCNIFFER was still able to converge to the location of highest leakage in the expected number of measurements. In this context, it is worth mentioning that as the size of the chip under attack increases, finding the location of the cryptographic engine could be a difficult task. In such scenarios like attacking large systems, this SCNIFFER framework could be extremely useful in efficiently determining the position of maximum leakage and then performing the attack at the best point of leakage. showing the scanning algorithm performs well, finding the point of max leakage within 40 TVLA tests in all cases. The initial sampling grid was 2 × 2 and the step size was 0.84mm. Note that for RSA, one of the initial samples is already close to the maximum, and this maximum is found in just one step. For AES and DES, whose leakage patterns are less smooth, and have smaller areas of high leakage, the time to find the maximum is higher.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work has introduced SCNIFFER, a fully automated integrated system for conducting end-to-end EM side-channel attacks against cryptographic systems. SCNIFFER combines an EM leakage scanning platform, and correlation EM analysis into a single system, which can perform all steps of an attack automatically. The system is comprised of a lowcost custom scanning hardware and gradient search heuristic based scanning algorithm. We also plan to make our code for implementing the efficient SCNIFFER framework and controlling the low-cost 3-D printer for scanning publicly available.
SCNIFFER is capable of using a variety of measures of leakage, and the search algorithm was shown to find the location of maximum leakage in an N × N chip search space with O(N ) measurements, providing a significant improvement over exhaustive search, and performing all stages of the search and attack completely automatically, removing the need for expert analysis.
Using this fully automated attack, it is possible to efficiently find the point of highest leakage and launch a CEMA attack at this location at the press of a button. The attack uses a minimal number of traces, for a variety of microcontroller architectures and cryptographic algorithms. Even as the size of the chip increases, or as protections increasing the MTD are put in place, SCNIFFER retains efficiency. Finally, we show that as the SNR of the system under attack decreases, SCNIFFER attacks maintain their advantage over existing methods, reducing the number of traces needed by a factor of N compared to an exhaustive search, for an N × N scan of a chip.
A demonstration of SCNIFFER operating in TVLA only mode can be found here.
